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PROMOTING DECENTRALIZED AND FLEXIBLE BUDGETS IN 
ENGLAND: LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
Sarah Ayres, University of Bristol and Ian Stafford, Cardiff University 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The UK has traditionally been viewed as a classic example of a unitary state in which 
central institutions dominate decision making. The recent Labour Government sought 
to counter this convention through devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and London and administrative decentralization to the English regions. This article 
examines New Labour’s efforts to promote sub-national policy discretion and fiscal 
autonomy via the Regional Funding Allocations (RFA) process. Findings are 
subsequently drawn upon to offer insights into the difficulties the Coalition 
government is likely to face in its endeavor to decentralize functions and budgets to 
local authorities and communities. The paper addresses two central questions (i) Can 
New Labour’s attempt to promote decentralized and flexible budgets in England be 
viewed as evidence of a transition to a more fluid, multi-level form of governance? 
(ii) What lessons can be harnessed from the RFA experience in taking forward the 
Coalition government’s plans to promote fiscal discretion at the sub-national tier? It 
concludes that there are deep-rooted barriers in Whitehall that may limit the freedoms 
and flexibilities pledged to local government and could undermine efforts to 
decentralize.    
 
KEY WORDS: Budgets, decentralization, localism, Westminster Model, Hollowing 
Out, Regional Funding Allocations 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and an elected Mayor in London 
have replaced traditional, more unitary forms of territorial politics in the UK (Jeffery 
and Wincott, 2010). However, New Labour’s approach in the English regions, outside 
London, centered on a more limited form of administrative decentralization based 
within policy and fiscal frameworks defined by the Centre (Hazell, 2006). Under 
administrative decentralization the responsibilities of the regional tier were enhanced 
through promoting local flexibilities in the context of national performance incentives 
(HM Treasury and Cabinet Office, 2004), acknowledging the important role of the 
regions in achieving policy integration and strategic planning (HM Government, 
2009; Counsell et al., 2007; Haughton et al., 2010) and working with local 
government, Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) and City-regions to promote economic 
development and regeneration (HM Treasury et al., 2007; Fenwick et al., 2009; 
Harrison, 2010). However, unlike the devolved territories, there was no ‘location 
dimension to the allocation of public expenditure to the regions of England’ (Heald 
and Short, 2002, p. 743) and regional objectives were shaped and restrained by 
priorities and funding streams dictated by separate Whitehall departments (Parker et 
al., 2010).  
 
Introduced in 2005, Regional Funding Allocations (RFAs) were intended to ‘enhance 
regional input into government policy development, showing how such priorities 
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relate to each other to form a coherent, credible and strategic vision for improving the 
economic performance of regions; and how these priorities are aligned to resources’ 
(HM Treasury et al., 2005, p. 3). For the first time major funding streams for 
economic development, housing, transport, and, latterly, skills were examined jointly 
by key partners to promote a more cohesive approach to the long-term management of 
resources. The significance of RFAs lay in the opportunity it offered to challenge the 
silo or ‘blow pipe’ funding (Heald and Short, 2002) emanating from Whitehall and to 
coordinate investment at the sub-national level. RFAs also reflected a wider ‘global 
trend’ towards devolution (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2004) and the assumption that 
effective regional governance could play an important role in promoting economic 
productivity and growth (Goodwin et al., 2005). New Labour rhetoric espoused the 
need for a more decentralized, coordinated and collaborative approach to sub-national 
policy making and delivery (Jordan, 2007). Nonetheless, given the UK’s tradition of 
centralized control over policy-making and resources, whether Whitehall would 
become more attuned to incorporating regional priorities into national spending 
programmes was uncertain (Marsh, 2008).  
 
More recently, the Coalition Government has set out plans to dismantle the regional 
administrative tier in England, including the abolition of Local Authority Leaders 
Boards (LALBs) and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), which have had 
responsibility for regional spatial and economic planning and removing the 
Government’s Regional Offices (GOs). Alongside the transfer of the spatial planning 
function to district councils, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), consisting of 
groupings of local authorities and business partners are being established, based upon 
‘natural’ economic areas to lead ‘improved coordination of public and private 
investment in transport, housing, skills, regeneration and other areas of economic 
development’ (HM Treasury, 2010, p.31). Recent announcements by ministers have 
extolled the virtues of local discretion over objectives, functions and budgets (Clark, 
2010; Pickles, 2010). Particular stress has been placed on rolling out the ‘Total Place’ 
initiative that seeks to examine all public spending in individual localities as a way of 
avoiding overlap and duplication between organizations’ budgets and delivering a 
step change in both service improvement and efficiency at the local level (HM 
Treasury and DCLG, 2010). Likewise, the Government has announced a £1.4bn 
Regional Growth Fund which aims to consolidate fragmented funding streams into 
one pot to support local economic growth (HM Government, 2010). These reforms 
will challenge Whitehall’s centralist disposition but the prospect of departments 
yielding control over resources to local councils cannot be assumed. 
 
At first sight, therefore, we appear to be presented with two contrasting accounts of 
the relationship between Whitehall and the sub-national tier. One the one hand, 
devolution and decentralization in the UK epitomizes the transfer from the 
Westminster Model to a ‘differentiated polity’ (Rhodes, 1997), in which the 
traditional functions of the state are being ‘hollowed out’ (Jessop, 2004). The retreat 
of the nation state is viewed as a consequence of pressures from above via 
globalization, from below amidst demands for devolution, and from within due to the 
revival of free market ideologies and the perceived incapacity of the state to manage 
the economy and maintain control over policy outcomes (Labao et al., 2009). By 
contrast, others contend that ‘the evidence for decentralization of any significance is 
insubstantial’ (Cox, 2009, p. 107). Indeed, the growing range of powers held in 
Whitehall have led many to question the extent to which New Labour’s regional 
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experiment resulted in ‘state rescaling’ of any significance (Holliday, 2000). Cairney 
(2009, p. 358) argues that ‘the Centre is still the most powerful actor and the loss of 
control described by the hollowing-out thesis is exaggerated’. Likewise, the 
Coalition’s pledge to devolve power to localities will require a  fundamental rethink 
of Whitehall standard practice and many believe that Whitehall remains ill equipped 
to deliver (Jones and Stewart, 2010).  
 
On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the pattern of responses to 
decentralization may be more diverse and complex that that posited by either 
perspective. A further layer of complexity is derived from the fact that departments 
have varying levels of commitment to decentralization. Ayres and Stafford (2009, p. 
618) note that ‘different departmental positions reflect a desire by ministers to 
orchestrate a regional architecture that enables them to meet their own individual 
objectives’. Likewise, Entwistle (2010, p. 613) calls for a more nuanced theory of 
intergovernmental relationships than can be provided by the centralization-
decentralization dichotomy stating that ‘differences between central departments 
mean that different services, within the same local authority, are likely to experience 
very different relationships with central government’. Rather than being characterized 
by either a unitary or devolved state it may be more appropriate to refer to a ‘hybrid 
state’ that reflects different ‘patterns of central-local relations, public administration 
and fiscal relations’ (Loughlin, 2009, p. 51).  
 
Drawing on a recent comprehensive examination of the Regional Funding Allocations 
process, the aim of this paper is to examine the complexities of evolving inter-
governmental relations in England from a Whitehall perspective. Based on an analysis 
of official documents and semi-structured interviews conducted with senior Whitehall 
officials involved in the RFA process between July 2007 and August 2010, the paper 
offers a valuable insight into the workings of Whitehall departments in their attempts 
to pursue a more decentralized approach to policy making. Whitehall’s differentiated 
response to decentralization is often cited as an impediment to generating a more 
cohesive and sustainable approach to territorial politics in England (Mrinska, 2008). 
This paper examines different departmental approaches to managing RFAs and the 
subsequent impacts on sub-national policy discretion. Senior Whitehall officials were 
interviewed in HM Treasury and the Departments for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(DBIS), Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Transport (DfT), Work and 
Pensions (DWP), Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) and Government Office 
Network. Respondents were asked about the driving forces behind RFAs, 
departmental arrangements for dealing with RFA submissions, perceptions on 
regional governance capacity and the impact of the economic downturn on the RFA 
process. Twenty-three interviews were conducted, lasting approximately one hour. 
Each was conducted under Chatham House Rules, digitally recorded, transcribed and 
manually coded to illicit findings.      
 
The paper seeks to address two central questions. Can New Labour’s attempt to 
promote decentralized and flexible budgets in England be viewed as evidence of a 
transition to a more fluid, multi-level form of governance? What lessons can be 
harnessed from the RFA experience in taking forward the Coalition government’s 
plans to promote fiscal discretion at the sub-national tier? The paper is divided into 
four sections. Following this introduction, section two examines New Labour’s 
motives behind introducing RFAs and departmental aspirations for the scheme. 
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Section three discusses the opportunities and limitations of RFAs within the context 
of six key policy objectives, namely (i) consistency with national priorities (ii) 
realistic prioritization (iii) evidence-based priorities (iv) consensus-based priorities (v) 
promoting policy coordination and (vi) enhancing the long-term management of 
resources. We conclude by reflecting on whether the RFA scheme challenged 
intergovernmental relations characterized by the Westminster Model and offer a 
number of lessons that might inform future attempts to enhance local control over 
budgets.    
 
GOVERNMENT MOTIVATIONS BEHIND REGIONAL FUNDING 
ALLOCATIONS 
 
Policy context 
 
Under the RFA scheme, indicative budget allocations for economic development, 
housing and transport policy were identified for the 2005-08 spending review period. 
In addition, the Government spelt out longer term planning assumptions of the 
amount of funding that was likely to be made available in these core policy areas over 
the following ten years. Regional partners, including representatives of the GOs, 
RDAs and unelected Regional Assemblies were invited to jointly prepare advice to 
ministers on how these allocations should be spent. They were also asked to consider 
the scope for vireing (or transferring) allocations between budget headings, where this 
would assist integration. An option to defer funding was also granted so that money 
could be combined with future planned investment to deliver large scale projects that 
benefited the region. 
 
The rationale underpinning RFAs reflected many of New Labour’s aspirations for 
regional governance. The Devolving Decision Making Review, for example, sought to 
identify how ‘best to achieve decentralized delivery and responsive local and regional 
services in a way that is consistent with equity and efficiency, against a clear 
framework of national standards’ (HM Treasury and Cabinet Office, 2004, p. 1). The 
RFA scheme was initiated and driven forward by Treasury officials who believed that 
allocating resources over the long-term would contribute to boosting regional 
economic productivity and help meet the Public Service Agreement (PSA) target to 
reduce regional economic disparities. The Treasury’s view was not, however, shared 
by all in Whitehall. As the main sponsors of RDAs, the then Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR) wanted greater clarity over RDA 
funding and RFAs were seen to offer this. Likewise, the Department for Transport 
(DfT) favored RFAs as it saw itself as the likely beneficiary of virement. ‘There were 
[however] split views within the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) and a lack of consensus about whether housing should be part of the process’ 
(DCLG official). Some DCLG officials acknowledged the potential synergies with 
other areas, while others viewed RFAs as a ‘distraction’ from core departmental 
targets, such as the provision of affordable housing. Similarly, while skills funding 
had been a Treasury ‘front runner’ for inclusion in the first round of RFAs this 
proposal was quietly dropped due to reservations in the Department for Education and 
Skills (DfES) about the possibility of vireing funds. A DCLG official described the 
process of selecting policy areas as almost whimsical, ‘The inclusion of policy areas 
was rather dictated by those departments who were willing to play ball, rather than a 
considered strategy. Don’t underestimate the influence of happenstance’.  
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In 2007 a second round of RFAs was announced as part of the Treasury’s Sub-
national Review of Economic Development and Regeneration (SNR) with skills and 
employment policy mooted for inclusion (HM Treasury et al., 2007). But, despite 
Treasury efforts, both the Departments for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) 
and Work and Pensions (DWP) resisted the move, fearing virement and loss of 
control to regional bodies (Ayres and Stafford, 2009). The Treasury was forced to 
make an embarrassing U-turn and an awkward compromise was struck. DWP refused 
any involvement and while regional actors would prepare advice on skills policy as 
part of the RFA exercise, skills would ‘not be included in the RFA funding envelope’ 
(HM Treasury et al., 2008, p. 15). This clause removed any prospect of transferring 
skills expenditure to other policy areas.  
 
Programmes and budgets 
 
In the first round of RFAs the following programmes were included: 
 
 Transport - capital funding projected for major schemes in Local Transport 
Plans and major Highways Agency schemes, other than on those roads of the 
greatest strategic national and international importance, 
 Housing - Regional Housing Fund and Housing Market Renewal Pathfinder 
funding, and 
 Economic development - Regional Development Agency Single Budget (HM 
Treasury et al., 2005, p. 5). 
 
The regional distribution of funding was allocated using established formulae in the 
cases of economic development and housing and a newly developed formula for 
transport (In House Policy Consultancy, 2005). Funding allocations for 2005-06 to 
2007-08 are set out in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
In the second RFA round the following funding streams were added: 
 
 Transport - Local Authority block allocations for integrated transport & 
maintenance (from 2011-12) 
 Housing - English Partnerships Fund, Community Infrastructure Fund, 
Thames Gateway Funding (only South East and Eastern regions), 
 Economic development - European Regional Development Funds (HM 
Treasury et al., 2008, p. 15). 
 
Funding allocations for 2008-09 to 2010-11 are set out in Table 2. Skills funding for 
Regional Offices of the Learning and Skills Councils (LSC) was also indicated 
(£9.4bn over three years), albeit outside the formal RFA funding envelope, and 
regions were asked to provide advice, 
 
‘to help inform the work that the Regional Skills Partnership and the Learning 
and Skills Council do at a regional level’ (HM Treasury et al., 2008, p. 15).  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
6 
 
 
 
 
As Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate RFA funds increased considerably from £3,941m in 
2005-06 to £7,726m in 2010-11. However, interviews revealed that there was little 
consideration in Whitehall about the collective effects of these budgets or whether 
budget allocations would need to be revised in individual regions as a consequence. 
As an official in the Government Office (GO) Network stated, ‘the way budgets have 
been brought together is a consequence of serendipity. There has been no attempt to 
think strategically about how regional formulae might be affected by bringing these 
programmes together’. Indeed, Whitehall departments were more concerned with 
protecting ‘their resources and did not view RFAs as a genuine pooling or 
decentralization of budgets’ (DBERR official).     
 
Guidance on preparing advice 
 
The Government issued a common template that set out how regional advice should 
be prepared, including:  
 
 Evidence-based - priorities should be based on robust regional evidence, 
 Agreed within the region - as far as possible, regional funding allocations advice 
should represent a regionally-agreed view of priorities, 
 Realistic - cost estimates should be robust and proposals tested for deliverability,  
 Consistent - advice should be consistent with wider national policy objectives and 
take into account regional and local strategies except where robust evidence is 
presented for different priorities (HM Treasury et al., 2005, p. 8). 
 
The guidance reflected New Labour’s desire to facilitate partnership working. 
Decision making needed to reflect ‘a process which engages a wide range of regional 
stakeholders, to ensure that the region benefits from the widest possible evidence 
base, and to create conditions in which a consensus can emerge’ (HM Treasury et al., 
2005, p. 7). While policy networks existed across the core areas, it was felt that ‘the 
added incentive of cash would prompt a more focused discussion on policy 
objectives’ (DCLG official).  
 
The 2008 RFA guidance added two new criteria: 
 
 Value for money - regional advice should represent value for money, with costed 
proposals that have been tested for deliverability, so far as is reasonably practical.  
 Reflect the priorities emerging in Multi-Area Agreements - where MAAs have 
been signed-off or are in development, regional advice should be consistent with 
the MAA evidence base (HM Treasury et al., 2008, p. 12-13).  
 
The rationale for these additions was primarily driven by individual departments. The 
‘value for money’ criteria reflected concerns within DfT around considerable 
overspend and slippage in transport schemes (Faulkner, 2006). The second reflected 
DCLG’s desire to protect the influence of local authorities in economic development 
following the SNR. The Review set out proposals to give local authorities a greater 
role in economic development and focus investment in emerging MAAs (Pearce and 
Mawson, 2009). As a consequence, DCLG felt that the priorities of MAAs should be 
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given precedence - a position that potentially placed them at odds with the motives of 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) and the RDAs that were 
looking to maintain a strong regional focus.  
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF RFAs 
 
The Government’s formal guidance (HM Treasury et al., 2005; 2008) indicated that 
RFAs were intended to achieve the following objectives:    
 
 Consistency with national priorities 
 Realistic prioritization 
 Evidence based priorities 
 Consensus based priorities 
 Promote policy coordination 
 Enable the long-term management of resources 
 
The following analysis examines whether these objectives were realized. 
 
Consistency with national priorities 
 
RFAs represented pots of money already allocated via the Spending Review process 
and, as such, were strongly linked to national targets and priorities. Regional 
economic development and housing funding streams had already been decentralized 
via the RDAs’ Single Pot in 2001 and through Regional Housing Strategies (RHSs), 
launched as part of the Sustainable Communities Plan in 2003 (HM Treasury and 
DTI, 2001; ODPM, 2003). Consequently, spending priorities for these two areas had 
already been decided for the 2004 spending review period and shaped spending 
priorities post 2007/8. This left minimal scope for policy manoeuvre and ensured that 
RFAs echoed national priorities and regional strategies already agreed with relevant 
departments.  
 
It was the first time, however, that regional partners had been accorded the 
opportunity to identify transport priorities linked to investment. According to some 
Whitehall officials, this provided scope for more systematic transport planning at the 
regional level, the generation of a more robust evidence base to inform decision 
making and the possibility of joining up transport activities with associated policy 
areas (SQW, 2006). The RFA process, therefore, had the potential to open up conflict 
between DfT and the regions. However, for the most part, regions tended to present 
‘government friendly’ suggestions - perhaps not surprising as the guidance indicated 
that submissions were more likely to be approved if they met national targets. As 
Neill (2009, p. 9) suggests, ‘because regions are obliged to follow national targets set 
by their funding departments, investment in regional priorities has come a poor 
second to meeting Whitehall goals’. Nonetheless, a DfT official acknowledged that 
some cynics in the regions thought that departments ‘would put RFA advice in the bin 
and do what they [departments] wanted to do anyway’. To the contrary, DfT accepted 
98% of the advice presented (Faulkner, 2006), leading a DfT official to conclude that 
the RFA exercise had actually led to a reduction in tensions between local and 
regional actors and the Centre,  
 
‘The conflict in the past was usually the regions lobbying for completely 
unrealistic levels of spend. Now they’ve got indicative budgets allocations it's 
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more about managing within that framework so it has actually decreased the 
potential for conflict’. 
 
During the second round of RFAs a number of factors served to reinforce the 
influence of national priorities. First, DIUS was reluctant to acknowledge regional 
priorities for skills that did not match national thinking. As a DCLG official observed, 
 
“DIUS believed skills policy is about the individual and did not see why there 
should be regional control of those budgets. They have national targets and 
local mechanisms for delivery so they did not see the relevance of the regional 
tier. But Treasury wanted skills there so it was a compromise. I suspect that in 
the end DIUS said ‘you [regions] make the case and we will ignore it’ and 
that’s essentially what they did”.   
 
During March 2009 regional meetings were held between Whitehall officials and 
regional actors to discuss RFA 2 submissions. Respondents indicated that there were 
‘fractious’ exchanges between officials from the North East and DIUS. However, in 
the face of opposition, DIUS stuck firm. ‘Our position was clear in that the LSC 
budgets are not up for grabs. That led to difficult discussions with some regions but 
we were not in a position to grant anything else’ (DIUS official). A Treasury-led 
Cross Departmental Steering Group was established to facilitate negotiations around 
RFAs, comprising senior officials with a ‘regional remit’ across participating 
departments. However, the Group had minimal influence in persuading DIUS to abide 
with the spirit of the RFA scheme. Indeed, it was not within its remit to ‘lobby’ 
departments to respond to RFA submissions in particular ways. The Group’s activities 
were confined to information dissemination and facilitating cross-departmental 
discussions. So, even with the Treasury at the helm, it remained impossible to cajole 
the big delivery departments to engage in regional working that did not fit with their 
departmental objectives. This indicates that despite ministerial rhetoric around 
decentralization, the RFA process was dictated by a highly politicised game that 
reflected deep rooted departmental positions, cultures and legacies. It also underlies 
the importance of generating buy-in across all departments if schemes that require a 
joined-up response are to succeed.    
 
Second, the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) was formed on 1st December 
2008 through the transfer of the functions and assets of English Partnerships, the 
investment functions of the Housing Corporation, a number of delivery programmes 
from DCLG and the transfer of the Academy for Sustainable Communities (HCA, 
2010). Consequently, the housing element of RFAs had to be approved by the new 
Agency. Some Whitehall officials questioned the amount of discretion granted by 
DCLG to the HCA and whether it was able to respond to regional priorities and 
consider coordinating investment with other areas. As a DCLG official noted, 
 
‘The HCA was a new agency that hadn’t delivered yet so to give them more 
flexibility would make Ministers very nervous. This forced them to stick 
closely to identified national targets’.  
 
More generally, Whitehall officials indicated that RFA submissions presented no 
challenge to the Centre. As Goldsworthy (2009, p. 6) argued, ‘the current system of 
regional government is a jigsaw puzzle of pieces whose shapes and sizes are 
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determined by central government for their administrative convenience’. Departments 
appeared to be utilizing RFAs as a route to achieving national objectives, rather than 
an avenue for enhancing policy coordination and genuine sub-national discretion.  
 
Realistic prioritization 
 
Officials in all government departments were clear that prioritization was the key to 
successful RFA submissions. They confirmed that regions had improved prioritization 
with successive attempts, particularly in the area of transport. Nonetheless, significant 
challenges remained, most notably the limited resources attached to RFAs. Funding 
allocations amounted to £7.6bn in 2009/10 (economic development £2.2bn, housing 
£3.3bn, transport £2.1bn). While significant, this represented just 14% of total public 
expenditure in the three policy areas and 1.5% of public expenditure in the regions 
(HM Treasury and National Statistics, 2009). Regions were, therefore, being asked to 
prioritize investment decisions but they only had control over a small percentage of 
total regional expenditure. As noted previously, the fact that RFA money was already 
committed to delivering a series of national programmes meant that in reality there 
was limited scope for discretion at the sub-national level. Consequently, considerable 
difficulties arose in coordinating RFAs with related expenditure that fell outside the 
RFA remit. There was a view in Whitehall that regional actors needed to work in 
partnership with other agencies, including regional non-governmental organizations to 
secure influence over additional funding. However, this proved difficult when arms-
length bodies were themselves restrained by central targets and funding 
accountabilities that did not encourage joint working (Leslie and Dallison, 2008).  
 
A second challenge for prioritization was Whitehall’s preference for investment based 
on maximum economic impact as expressed by Gross Value Added (GVA), rather 
than an emphasis on social and geographical equity. As Pike and Tomaney (2009, p. 
14) note, ‘the experience of economic development within England is marked by 
complexity, experimentation, fragmentation and incoherence with largely negative 
implications for territorial equity and justice’. A Treasury official illustrated this 
point, 
 
‘We don’t want jam spreading that ensures that all localities get their slice of 
the cake. We want regions to take hard decisions based on where the 
opportunities lie in that region and where they feel they will get the best 
returns in terms of boosting productivity’. 
 
This view was echoed in the SNR, which stressed the need for investment in city-
regions or MAAs, rather than rural areas (Mawson, 2009). In these circumstances, 
however, it proved difficult for regions to secure buy-in from localities that were 
unlikely to be the beneficiaries of additional funds. There was also the likelihood of 
enhanced competition between MAAs and localities that all felt that their schemes 
were  the most important in securing increased regional productivity leading, 
potentially, to wasteful forms of territorial competition and the further embedding of 
geographical inequalities (Rodriguez-Pose, 2009).  
 
Evidence based priorities 
 
Providing a clear evidence base and enhancing fiscal transparency are seen as a 
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‘means of improving economic governance arrangements’ (Heald, 2003, p. 723). 
However, perhaps surprisingly, the arrangements that departments employed to 
appraise evidence in RFA submissions can best be described as ‘patchy’. Interviews 
revealed that there were limited formal arrangements to examine (i) the credibility of 
evidence presented in regional advice or (ii) the procedures developed by regional 
actors when making decisions about their advice. A Treasury official indicated that 
the Department did not have the resources to consider the evidence used by regions in 
a ‘systematic or extensive way’. Instead it adopted a ‘broad brush’ analysis combined 
with assessments by participating departments and discussions with GO officials. 
Indeed, much appeared to ‘depend upon goodwill and trust’ (Treasury official) with 
officials accepting evidence presented to them as reliable. Likewise a DBIS official 
described the scrutiny of RFA evidence as being based primarily on ‘gut feeling’. 
Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that the Department had more robust arrangements 
for analyzing the Regional Economic Strategies (RESs), which underpinned the 
economic development strand of the RFAs. Similarly a DCLG official described their 
scrutiny procedures,  
 
‘I have read the Regional Spatial Strategies and Regional Economic Strategies 
so I know the evidence base that they are drawing on. We have lots of 
evidence around housing demand and national models so we know if it rings 
true.’ 
 
Nonetheless, the same DCLG official indicated that, ‘I think some of the evidence is 
finessed. There is a balancing act between the evidence base and regional ambition’. 
This raised questions over the transparency and validity of regional evidence.  
 
Officials in DfT pointed out that there were no specified procedures for examining 
regional evidence, outside of their own value for money reviews. This presented a 
particular problem for the prioritization of transport programmes and projects because 
regional transport advice was based in many cases on evidence provided by scheme 
promoters and the quality of this evidence was debatable (DfT, 2007). Most regions 
had opted to commission consultants, largely paid by DfT, to generate prioritization 
methodologies for the transport strand of RFA submissions. Methodologies varied 
across the regions but most involved assessing whether schemes (i) contributed to 
regional objectives (ii) represented value for money and (iii) were deliverable. In most 
instances, key personnel working on transport submissions rallied to get different 
stakeholders and partners signed up to the logic underpinning the methodology. 
‘Then, once all the data had been number crunched, stakeholders had to agree with the 
outcomes whether they liked it or not’ (DfT official).  
 
Consensus based priorities 
 
Whitehall departments believed that procedures for developing RFA advice should 
vary depending on the political, social and economic peculiarities of different regions. 
As Boschma (2004, p. 1001) states, ‘there exists no “optimal” development model, it 
is difficult to copy or imitate a successful model from elsewhere, and new trajectories 
often emerge spontaneously and unexpectedly in space’. During round one, the GOs 
were charged with a ‘facilitator’ role, with RDAs and Regional Assemblies taking the 
lead on preparing submissions. The GOs shared insights with departments as to the 
consultation and partnership processes that regions had undertaken, although a DCLG 
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official indicated that this process had ‘not been hugely successful because the 
responsibility for reporting back to departments was delegated too low within the 
GOs’. It is unclear whether this was the direct cause, but Whitehall officials involved 
in reviewing RFA submissions appeared to know little about partnership 
arrangements across individual regions and were not able to comment on regional 
governance capacity and how this may have impacted on the quality of RFA 
submissions.  
 
Undoubtedly, DfT undertook the most thorough analysis of regional procedures. The 
Department commissioned an independent report on the first round of RFAs 
(Faulkner, 2006) and carried out a consultation on how RFA submissions should be 
developed (DfT, 2006). The consultation highlighted that the procedures for 
developing regional priorities could have been more inclusive, particularly in relation 
to engaging environmental interests. This point was echoed in a report by the 
Campaign for Better Transport (2009), which found that environmental groups felt 
excluded from RFA negotiations. Despite these findings, DfT concluded that it would 
be ‘inconsistent with the spirit of devolving advice to be explicit about how advice 
should be assembled’ (DfT, 2006, p. 3.6).   
 
During round two, RFA submissions were being prepared amidst the institutional 
changes brought about by the SNR. Regional Leaders Boards, comprising local 
authority leaders, were coming into place and working with RDAs to develop Single 
Regional Strategies (SRSs) and RFA submissions. This was a period of significant 
institutional repositioning, uncertainty and jockeying for influence in the regions 
(Townsend, 2009). Whitehall officials were split on the extent to which this impacted 
on the quality of RFA submissions. Officials in the Treasury, DCLG and DBIS 
indicated that it had improved joint working around RFA submissions as there was 
more of an onus on sub-national partners working together. A DBIS interviewee 
commented that ‘RFA submissions provided something for regional partners to get 
their teeth into post SNR and forced new actors to come together around a common 
purpose’. However, officials working on skills in DBIS and in DfT were more 
skeptical; ‘with so much going on in the regions, I suspect the whole process of 
working on RFAs was a bit tiresome’ (DfT official).  
 
There was also a view in Whitehall that tough decisions were more difficult to reach 
now that local authorities had a larger role in negotiations. A Treasury official 
indicated that ‘a local authority dimension brings with it a focus on territory and 
parochialism that might not have been so evident before’. One way of resolving this 
was to enhance the leadership role of the newly appointed Regional Ministers in 
managing tensions between local interests. Whitehall officials felt that Regional 
Ministers had an important role to play, although their involvement varied across 
regions. A DfT official suggested that their involvement had ‘resulted in more jam 
spreading and less prioritizing than in the first round of RFAs, as Regional Ministers 
sought to ensure that all areas got a proportion of funds in a bid to keep the peace’. It 
was also unclear whether they were charged with championing the region in 
Whitehall or ensuring that central government policy was implemented in the regions. 
Whitehall interviewees were clear that it was the latter.  
 
Promote policy coordination 
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The extent to which the RFA process facilitated enhanced policy coordination can be 
examined across three distinct dimensions (i) horizontal links across Whitehall 
departments (ii) vertical links between Whitehall and the regions and (iii) horizontal 
policy coordination at the regional level.  
 
First, in order for regions to join up their policies, Whitehall itself needed to join up 
(Mrinska, 2008). There was, however, limited evidence of enhanced 
interdepartmental working as a consequence of RFAs. Part of the remit of the RFA 
Cross Departmental Steering Group was to gather information and disseminate it 
across departments. A DfT member described the Group as a ‘sort of clearing house’, 
receiving evidence from the GOs. It also considered the potential alignment of policy 
areas within RFA submissions. While these arrangements provided an opportunity for 
dialogue, a DCLG official noted that the role of the Group was fairly minimal and 
worked on an ‘ad hoc basis’. This was especially the case during the second round of 
RFAs when ‘departments were more concerned with managing the fallout from the 
economic downturn than dealing with regional priorities’ (Treasury official).   
 
Second, regional policy coordination required effective vertical links between 
Whitehall and the regions (HM Government, 2009). Nonetheless, the impact of RFAs 
varied across policy areas. In the cases of both DBIS and DCLG there was little 
evidence of any changes in the arrangements for liaising with regions on economic 
development and skills policy (DBIS took over responsibility for skills from DIUS in 
June 2009) or around housing priorities. RFA submissions largely represented work 
and priorities already agreed with these departments. A DBIS official pointed out that 
the Department’s RFA team was made up of only one or two officials and that its 
primary function was to manage responses within the Department, rather than re-
calibrating the ways in which the Department engaged with other departments or the 
sub-national tier.  
 
By contrast, the relationship between DfT and the regions was significantly affected 
by RFAs. From 2005, DfT had set up a system of regular meetings in the regions in 
order to assess transport schemes that might be included within RFA advice. This was 
viewed as essential in order to work through the uncertainties surrounding transport 
infrastructure costs and timetables for delivery (DfT, 2007). Each region had a ‘key 
contact’ in DfT, who was seen as vital in securing regular information flows both 
upwards to Whitehall and downwards to the regional tier. For DfT, the RFA process 
had effectively altered inter-governmental relationships for setting transport priorities 
between central, regional and local actors, ‘resulting in noteworthy efficiency savings’ 
(DfT official). Under the RFA system, local transport authorities needed approval for 
schemes from Regional Transport Boards (or Forums) before submitting them to DfT, 
‘leading to the removal of unsuitable schemes before the costly and time consuming 
process of appraisal at the Centre’ (DfT official).  
 
Finally, regional strategies and policy areas needed to be horizontally integrated to 
facilitate a more cohesive approach to policy implementation (Counsell et al., 2007). 
However, this proved difficult because accountabilities and funding streams emanated 
from separate Whitehall departments (Pearce and Ayres, 2007). RFAs were intended 
to respond to this gap by requiring individual regions to think collectively about 
regional priorities across core areas and Whitehall officials generally agreed that this 
had been broadly achieved. By contrast, a DCLG official stated,  
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‘My impression is that the individual policy strands are developed in isolation 
and then pulled together at the end to make submissions look like a coherent 
document. While there are limits in this, it does mean that senior executives 
would have had to look across the four areas collectively’.  
 
The option to vire (or transfer) funds between budget headings was also intended to 
overcome some of the budgetary constraints on sub-national policy coordination. 
Nevertheless, no region made the case to vire funds. Participating departments 
supported virement as long as it did not come out of their ‘pot’, which produced a 
stalemate in Whitehall. As a DCLG official explained,  
 
‘Across departments there is willingness about decentralization and joining up 
but when it comes to losing money they [ministers] will not agree to it. 
Departments will go so far and then there is a line that they will not cross’. 
 
Likewise, a DBIS official agreed that targets for the core areas ‘were difficult enough 
to achieve and moving money around would make it even harder to meet government 
targets’. The same official went on to comment that regions ‘were also coming under 
pressure from regional quangos not to move money around so it was not just 
Whitehall’. Formally, Whitehall departments supported virement and encouraged 
challenging and innovative submissions but regions mooting this were firmly 
rebuffed. The economic downturn also restricted the scope for virement in the second 
RFA round. As a Treasury official explained, ‘there were no spare resources, no 
margins and that was a problem’. Conversely, a senior official in the GO network 
suggested that the economic downturn made virement and pooling resources more 
desirable. 
 
“A sensible approach would be for departments to say ‘we have limited 
money, let’s pool it and look for added value from it. At the same time we 
could also insulate ourselves from the tough decision’. That of course is 
rational and sensible but it does not work in the current climate and is unlikely 
to happen”. 
 
Long-term management of resources 
 
Significant progress was made by regional actors in prioritizing programmes beyond 
the current spending review cycle. Indeed, Whitehall officials were clear that RFAs 
were not a ‘static’ process and that regions were constantly ‘tweaking and refining 
their priorities to take account of new eventualities and ensure that RFA plans are 
suitable and realistic over the longer-term’ (Treasury official). Whitehall officials 
were also in agreement that regional advice appeared to have ‘received noteworthy 
airtime in Whitehall’ (Treasury official) during crucial discussions around the Sub-
National and 2007 Comprehensive Spending Reviews (CSR). A DBIS official 
described the process,  
 
“The Treasury sent a letter to the key departments involved saying ‘in your 
submissions into the CSR please take into account this [RFA] advice’. So 
government departments made their bids into the Treasury for how much 
money they should have and why and in doing so they should show that they 
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have taken into account the regions’ RFA advice”. 
Precisely how this information was digested at the Centre and the impact that it had 
on the long term allocation of resources on a territorial bases is difficult to judge. But, 
as a DCLG official commented, 
 
‘If RFAs were not going to have any influence officials would have quietly 
buried them. The fact that the Treasury have said that they will do another 
round in 2009 gives you an indication of the fact that it has been taken 
seriously’.   
 
Nonetheless, because the pots of money included in the RFA scheme were 
comparatively small it can be assumed that such influence had minimal impact on 
overall government spend. In addition, other factors hindered attempts to develop a 
long-term, strategic approach to investment. First, government was asking regions to 
produce long-term, consensus based, strategic priorities in a policy environment that 
was itself becoming increasingly volatile and unstable. Indeed, in the period post the 
SNR, regional actors could not predict what was going to happen over the next six 
months, let alone 10-15 years. There was also the prospect of a general election and 
with it uncertainty about what parts of the regional architecture would be dismantled 
in the event of a change in government. A GO Network official indicated that work on 
RFAs and SRSs had perhaps ‘slowed down as regional bodies and local actors await 
the outcome of the general election’. Finally, the economic downturn in 2008 brought 
with it massive uncertainty about government expenditure. As a Treasury official 
described,  
 
‘We could not take on the advice in RFA 2 like we did in RFA 1 because of 
the recession. It has been a useful exercise to see what priorities are in the 
regions but the funding available had completely changed. Because we were 
not able to allocate figures over the long term the exercise was completely 
blown out of the water’.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper reveals a differentiated pattern of responses across Whitehall departments 
to decentralization, which has implications for methodology, theory and practice. 
First, methodologically, it underlines the value of a detailed analysis of responses in 
Whitehall to provide ‘rich descriptions’ of departmental positions and aspirations. In 
terms of theory, at first sight RFAs might be seen as evidence of decentralization. 
However, contrary to the notions of multi-level governance, the findings suggest that 
the scope for sub-national influence is firmly defined. It also underlines that scope for 
decentralization may be more variable than previously anticipated, with important 
implications for the current Coalition governments plans to transfer responsibilities 
for policy formation and implementation to the local tier.  
 
The account presented in this paper suggests that RFAs exerted a positive influence 
on the process of identifying regional priorities linked to investment and there were 
gains in prompting greater awareness in Whitehall of regional objectives. Moreover, 
there is evidence that civil servants became more receptive of the need to think about 
the spatial consequences of their decisions and provide the continuity of funding 
necessary to deliver sustainable development at the sub-national level. The ‘big prize’ 
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has undoubtedly been regional transport policy where RFAs were the catalyst for 
enhanced inter-governmental relations, transforming regional ‘wish lists’ into 
strategic priorities and a more consensual and evidence based approach to identifying 
viable transport schemes. A more sanguine view, however, is that while there has 
been growing awareness in Whitehall of the need to boost the competitiveness of 
England’s economically weaker regions and improve service delivery through 
decentralization and coordinating government tiers, RFAs represented ‘tinkering at 
the edges’ rather than any fundamental transfer of fiscal autonomy or devolution of 
power. Despite the rhetoric of decentralization in England, evidence indicates that 
progress has been highly variable and dependent on the whims and preferences of 
individual departments. In the absence of a constitutional master plan to deal with the 
outstanding ‘English Question’ (Hazell, 2006), territorial politics in England is 
characterized by a ‘hybrid state’, with different areas of policy being affected 
unevenly by decentralization (Loughlin, 2009).  
The desire in parts of Whitehall, most notably the Treasury, to pursue decentralization 
might be viewed as evidence of the emergence of a more fluid, multilevel form of 
governance characteristic of a ‘hollowed state’. Nonetheless, aside from transport, 
Whitehall delivery departments have been generally unable or unwilling to respond - 
the consequence of historical legacies that reflect the departmentalism and silo 
structures of the Westminster model (Rhodes, 1997). Whitehall wrangling and game 
playing around RFAs reflected a desire to maximize departmental objectives, rather 
than a cohesive strategy aimed at empowering localities. Pike and Tomaney (2009, p. 
29) argue that decentred, networked and plural forms of governance appear ‘to 
downplay the shadow of the nation state and the instrumental role of such a 
framework pushing down responsibility to lower institutions without concomitant 
shifts in authority and resources’. Indeed, this is an accurate description of the RFA 
process in that sub-national actors were given responsibility for policy development 
and deliver but without genuine control over associated funds.  
 
The new Coalition Government takes the view that strategic planning in areas such as 
economic development, housing, planning and transport at the regional level in 
England, beyond London, is unnecessary, lacks legitimacy and would be better 
handled at a local level. Consequently, the RFA process has been abandoned. 
Nonetheless, the Government has acknowledged the merits of a more integrated 
approach to public expenditure and greater flexibility over the delivery of local 
services as a way of achieving economic growth and greater effectiveness in the use 
of resources. The Minister for Decentralization has announced that ‘this government 
is genuinely committed to decentralization’ and ‘this will require a fundamental 
rethink of standard Whitehall practice’ (Clark, 2010). Our findings, from the RFA 
process, however, offer a cautionary tale for any government seeking to promote 
decentralized and flexible budgets in England. We identify the following lessons that 
might inform the Coalition Government’s plans.  
 It may be easier for Whitehall to overcome its distaste for devolved budgets if 
resources are devolved to authorities with democratic legitimacy, rather than an 
unelected regional tier. However, if sub-regions are to be the preferred territorial 
framework for policy integration, either in the form of LEPs, City-regions or 
MAAs, measures will be needed to demonstrate clear lines of accountability, 
possibly through either city mayors or statutory agreements. 
 A genuine commitment for local budgetary discretion and flexibility needs to be 
secured amongst all key domestic Whitehall spending departments. This is 
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essential to avoid repetitious stalemate, especially over the virement of resources 
between funding streams. At the same time this will place additional pressures on 
local authorities to demonstrate the potential benefits of a more cohesive approach 
to investment.        
 Adequate funds need to be ring-fenced to make a distinct difference to policy 
implementation at a local level. If sub-regions or localities are to demonstrate 
competence they need to have the levers at their disposal. It is only through 
demonstrating a capacity for improved policy making that localities can make the 
case for enhanced discretion, though the current severe cut backs in public 
expenditure will make any transfer of resources hugely challenging.  
 National and sub-national priorities need to complement one another. However, 
the predominance of national targets in the RFA process left minimal scope for 
policy manoeuvre, severely limiting the efficacy of the process. Localities, 
therefore, need to be given the freedoms to develop policy solutions tailored to 
local circumstances. The Total Place agenda and Regional Growth Fund will 
provide a useful test ground for gauging the Coalition’s commitment to local 
discretion and innovative approaches to service delivery.  
 Mechanisms for dealing with cross cutting issues at the Centre need to be 
improved if localities are to join up their activities.  
 Sub-national policy-making has continued to be undermined by the constant 
reordering of priorities and budgets and, despite impending spending cuts, efforts 
need to be made to secure a degree of continuity and certainty around spending 
programmes.  
 
If implemented, these proposals would have huge implications for the operations of 
Whitehall and it remains to be seen whether the Coalition’s plans to empower 
localities will be realized. Whitehall’s predisposition for centralism and 
departmentalism is deep-rooted and ill equipped to realize the benefits that can flow 
from cross-departmental strategic thinking or ‘joining up’ action at the sub-national 
level. As Jones and Stewart (2010, p. 1) note ‘we see no evidence that the 
Government appreciates the extent of change which would be needed…The instinct 
of ministers is to impose their views and not to devolve’. Furthermore, current 
pressures on public expenditure are likely to further undermine efforts to develop a 
performance and reward system within Whitehall that weaves longer term outcomes 
and investment planning into mainstream thinking (Greer, 2010). Indeed, despite 
renewed rhetoric around decentralization and localism in the UK, the stark reality is 
that Whitehall centralism is strong and enduring.    
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Table 1. Total planning assumptions by year, region and sector 2005-06 to 2007-08 
(£ million) 
 
 NW NE Y&H EM WM SW SE E Total 
Funding Allocations 2005-06 to 2007-08 
 
2005-
06 
Transport 113 42 83 71 88 84 135 92 708 
 Housing 250   86 144 116 182 137 367 167 1449 
 Economic 382  240 295 156 272 153 157 129 1784 
 Total 745 368 522 343 542 374 659 388 3941 
2006-
07 
Transport 115 43 85 73 90 86 138 94 724 
 Housing 249 88 147 125 186 158 384 191 1528 
 Economic 400 251 310 163 284 159 163 134 1864 
 Total 764 382 542 361 560 403 685 419 4116 
2007-
08 
Transport 117 43 87 74 92 88 141 96 738 
 Housing 249 91 154 143 193 203 421 241 1695 
 Economic 409 258 316 167 291 164 167 138 1910 
 Total 775 392 557 384 576 455 729 475 4343 
(Source: HM TREASURY et al., 2005, p. 5) 
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Table 2. Total planning assumptions by year, region and sector 2008-9 to 2910-11 (£ 
million) 
 
 NW NE Y&H EM WM SW SE E Total 
Funding Allocations 2008-09 to 2010-11 
 
2008-
09 
Transport 330 127 251 201 256 259 348 255 2031 
 Housing 550 170 284 221 325 333 624 429 2986 
 Economic 499 289 388 190 323 221 163 144 2217 
 Total 1379 586 923 611 904 813 1134 828 7233 
2009-
10 
Transport 344 124 256 213 264 267 362 263 2112 
 Housing 563 191 293 263 338 401 670 455 3274 
 Economic 478 286 370 188 320 221 161 142 2167 
 Total 1385 602 919 664 922 899 1192 861 7553 
2010-
11 
Transport 361 128 267 223 277 280 379 273 2195 
 Housing 531 187 289 291 361 382 785 457 3433 
 Economic 453 282 349 185 315 218 157 140 2099 
 Total 1345 597 905 699 953 880 1321 870 7726 
(Source: authors’ own. Data derived HM TREASURY et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
